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11 Introduction
In￿ ation persistence has been widely noted in the post-war period. Together with other facts of macroeco-
nomic behaviour, notably output persistence, it has motivated the search for dynamic general equilibrium
models that could account for such persistence. At the heart of models of this sort in current widespread
use is nominal rigidity, or price and in￿ ation stickiness, often modelled by contracts of the sort suggested
by Calvo (1983) with a backward-looking element due to indexation (or in some versions rule of thumb
behaviour by price setters unable to set their prices optimally). DSGE models with such a Phillips Curve
are exempli￿ed by Christiano et al (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003); they have been dubbed ￿ New
Keynesian￿or ￿ New NeoKeynesian Synthesis￿models. According to this line of theorising in￿ ation per-
sistence can be thought of as largely ￿ engineered into￿the structure of the economy by the speci￿cation
of the Phillips Curve itself. It should therefore be expected to be fairly constant with little e⁄ect from
any changes in monetary regime. By contrast there is an alternative line of theorising going back to
Lucas (1976) that would argue very di⁄erently. On this view, in￿ ation persistence is reduced or ￿nal
form behaviour re￿ ecting the joint behaviour of forcing (error and other exogenous) processes that have
natural persistence, a DSGE model with perhaps limited or even no nominal rigidity, and a monetary
regime that may vary with political choices and perceptions. This ￿nal form behaviour will vary with
regime and will not necessarily generate high persistence in all regimes.
This di⁄erence of approach has spawned a large body of empirical work examining the joint facts
of in￿ ation persistence and regime shift. Results have varied widely partly because of the di¢ culty of
pinning down the nature and frequency of regime shifts; in general the more frequent the shifts, the more
variable and the lower the persistence found. For the US Pivetta and Reis (2007) show that one can
￿nd a case in the univariate in￿ ation data alone for there being constancy of in￿ ation persistence from
the 1960s to the present day; thus one cannot reject the null of constancy. Equally they agree that one
cannot reject the null of a moderate decline as found by Cogley and Sargent (2002).
From the DSGE side there has also been much work on testing the capacity of various models to
mimic among other things the facts of in￿ ation persistence, in the form of the impulse response function
of in￿ ation to shocks ￿ for example again Christiano et al (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003). At this
stage the consensus favours the DSGE models with a fair degree of built-in rigidity; but there is still
much work to be done. In particular, most attention has inevitably been paid to the main samples of
data used rather than asking whether the models are robust across subsamples. An interesting question
that has been largely uninvestigated is whether these models can pick up changes in the impulse response
functions that could have been triggered by shifts in monetary regime.
It would clearly be most helpful for the investigation of these issues if one could achieve a reasonable
agreement on what monetary regimes were in existence and when. Then one could separate the data into
the relevant subsamples and estimate time-invariant time-series processes for each, thus establishing the
facts of in￿ ation persistence in each episode. Then also one could modify various contending versions of
an appropriate DSGE model and test which of these versions could best account for the facts of each
episode. This should enable one to answer the questions; which model version can best explain in￿ ation
persistence and are there model versions that cannot explain it at all? While there will still be many
other facts that one would like such models to explain and therefore many further fences for these models
to fall at, least we could have made some progress, in a Popperian way (Popper, 1934), in removing some
model versions from contention in so far as they fail over in￿ ation persistence.
It turns out that UK data is an answer to this implicit prayer. Whereas it has proved hard to
reach agreement on what monetary regimes were in place in the US and indeed whether there was ever
any change at all (except brie￿ y at the start of the 1980s with the experiment in the control of bank
reserves), for the UK there have been several well-documented changes in monetary regime. Furthermore
it is possible, as we will show, to back up the massive documentary evidence econometrically.
Thus in this paper we focus on the phenomenon of in￿ ation persistence in the UK over the post-war
period. We begin with the facts of regime change, the sine qua non of our methods here. We review the
shifts between ￿xed and ￿ oating exchange rates and within the latter between di⁄erent sorts of monetary
and other methods of in￿ ation control. We test our documented split of regimes using a method recently
suggested by Qu and Perron (2007) and we ￿nd reasonable support for our proposed splits. We are then
able to proceed to the next stage which is to estimate the facts of in￿ ation persistence in each episode;
we proceed as simply as possible, estimating a parsimonious univariate ARMA for each. As one would
expect in such subsamples the in￿ ation process is clearly stationary (a main reason for nonstationarity
is after all regime shift); furthermore we know from the DSGE models we set up that the ￿nal form of
the in￿ ation process will be an ARMA of ￿nite order. We then use the parameters of this ARMA and
2its implied impulse response function to assess the degree of persistence.
We then turn to the question of how much nominal rigidity is needed to account for the persistence
revealed in each episode. We take a standard DSGE model of the open economy with exogenous capital
and inject into it di⁄erent degrees of nominal rigidity; we follow the widely-used procedure of taking a
￿ stripped down￿model, where the Euler equations are converted into a forward-looking IS curve, and the
remainder of the model consists of the equations for the monetary or other in￿ ation-control regime in
place together with the Phillips Curve (and its varying degree of nominal rigidity). We test our di⁄erent
model versions by asking whether each in turn could have generated the patterns of persistence we ￿nd
in the actual data. To do this we generate the sampling variability within the model under each regime
by the method of bootstrapping the model￿ s estimated residuals; this permits us to ￿nd the statistical
distribution of the ARMA parameters in the in￿ ation regression under the null hypothesis of each model
and thus to reject or accept each model. We can also compare the impulse response functions we ￿nd in
the data with the 95% bounds generated by each model; this test essentially replicates the other one in
a more transparent way.
To anticipate our conclusions, ￿rst we do not ￿nd that in￿ ation persistence is a stylised constant; it
appears largely to disappear at various points in the post-war UK, notably most recently; this favours
the view that this is indeed connected to several changes in monetary regime, with di⁄erent regimes
exhibiting very di⁄erent degrees of persistence. Second, we ￿nd that while high stickiness can account
best for some regimes and low stickiness best for others, the best overall model across all regimes is one
with minimum stickiness.
In section 2 therefore we review earlier work on in￿ ation persistence and its measurement. In section
3 we estimate ARMA models for UK data in the various post-war regimes we identify. In section 4 we
set out our various models for each monetary regime, calibrate and ￿t them to the data, to ￿nd the
implied model errors later to be used in bootstrapping. In section 5 we carry out the bootstrap tests of
the models. Section 6 concludes.
2 In￿ ation persistence and its measurement
A large econometric literature has found that post-war US in￿ ation exhibits very high persistence, ap-
proaching that of a random walk process. Given similar evidence for other OECD countries, many
macroeconomists have concluded that high in￿ ation persistence is a ￿ stylised fact￿and have proposed
varied microeconomic interpretations. Roberts (1998), Ball (2000), Ireland (2000), Mankiw and Reis
(2002), Sims (2001) and Woodford (2001) assume that private agents face information-processing con-
straints. Buiter and Jewitt (1981), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (2000), Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof
(2001), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) assume that high in￿ ation persistence results from
the structure of nominal contracts. Others like Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Dittmar, Gavin and
Kydland (2001) and Ireland (2003) generate the persistence through the data generating processes of
the structural shocks hitting the economy. However, an alternative view is that the degree of in￿ ation
persistence is not an inherent structural characteristic of industrial economies, but in fact a function of
the monetary policy regime (see also West, 1988).
Over the past decade we have observed substantial shifts in the monetary policy of a number of
countries, particularly the widespread adoption of explicit in￿ ation targets. There is a growing body
of research supporting the view that the monetary regime in place has an impact on the persistence
properties of in￿ ation or in other words in￿ ation persistence is not an inherent characteristic of industrial
economies. Brainard and Perry (2000), Taylor (2000) and Kim, Nelson and Piger (2001) have found
evidence that US in￿ ation persistence during the Volcker-Greenspan era was substantially lower than
during the previous two decades; Ravenna (2000) documents a large post-1990 drop in Canadian in￿ ation
persistence; Batini (2002) ￿nds that UK and US in￿ ation had no persistence during the metallic-standard
era (prior to 1914), highest persistence during the 1970s and markedly lower persistence during the last
decade.
As Nelson (2001) points out, monetary policy in the UK has undergone several regime changes over
the last 50 years: from a ￿xed exchange rate with foreign exchange controls until 1972; to free-￿ oating
incomes policy with no domestic nominal anchor until 1978, followed by a system of monetary targeting
until the mid-1980s; then back to exchange rate management, the period of ￿ shadowing￿the Deutsche
Mark, which culminated in the membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from 1990-1992;
￿nally since 1992, in￿ ation targeting has been the o¢ cial regime governing UK monetary policy, with
interest rate decisions made by the UK government in collusion with the Bank of England up to May
1997 and after it by the Bank alone, under a new law mandating its procedures and target.
3For the period as a whole, there have been large swings both in in￿ ation and economic growth.
In￿ ation was continuously in double digits during most of the 1970s, and returned there in the early
1980s and 1990s. Nelson (2001) documents that economic growth, which was already lower in the UK
in comparison to its major trading partners in the 1960s, underwent a further slowdown after 1973,
with partial recovery beginning only in the 1980s. There were recessions in 1972, 1974-75, 1979-81 and
1990-92. However, the disin￿ ation of the early 1990s has been followed by a period of low and stable
in￿ ation and reasonably stable real GDP growth.
2.1 Measures of Persistence
A number of authors assume that in￿ ation follows a stationary autoregressive process of order p AR(p)):




where "t is a serially uncorrelated but possibly heteroscedastic random error term. In order to facilitate
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In the context of this model persistence can be de￿ned as the speed with which in￿ ation converges to
equilibrium after a shock in the disturbance term. Several measures of this have been proposed, including
the sum of autoregressive coe¢ cients, the spectrum at zero frequency,1 the largest autoregressive root
and the half life.2
Andrews and Chen (1994) argue that the cumulative impulse response function (CIRF) is a good way
of summarising the information contained in the impulse response function,3 and hence a good scalar




where ￿ is the sum of the autoregressive coe¢ cients. As there exists a monotonic relationship between
CIRF and ￿ it follows that one can use the sum of AR coe¢ cients, ￿ =
P
￿j, as a scalar measure of
persistence.4
An alternative measure of persistence widely used in the literature is given by the largest AR root ￿,






1The spectrum at zero frequency is a well-known measure of the low frequency autocovariance of the series. For the




" stands for the variance of "t. However, where one wants to test for
changes in persistence over time, the use of spectrum at zero frequency becomes problematic as changes in persistence will
be brought about not only by changes in ￿ but also by changes in ￿2
".
2The half-life is de￿ned as the number of periods for which the e⁄ect of a unit shock to in￿ation remains above 0.5.
It is a very popular measure of persistence particularly in the literature that evaluates the persistence of deviations from
the purchasing power parity equilibrium. See for example Murray and Papell (2002) and Rossi (2001). For criticsm of this
measure of persistence see Pivetta and Reis (2007).
3Impulse Response Functions (IRF) are an intuitive way to interpret measures of in￿ation persistence. IRF gives the
response of in￿ation at various future dates to a shock that occurs today. CIRF as the name suggests is the concept of
cumulative impact of a shock and is well documented in Hamilton (1994).
4Andrews and Chen (1994) note that that CIRF and thus ￿ may not be su¢ cient to fully capture all the shapes in the
impulse response functions. For e.g. CIRF and ￿ will not be able to distinguish between two series in which one exhibits
a large initial increase and then a subsequent quick decrease in the IRF while the other exhibits a relatively small initial
increase followed by a subsequent slow decrease in the IRF.
4It is easy to show that in the distant future, the impulse response of in￿ ation to a shock becomes
increasingly dominated by the largest root, so the size of ￿ is a key determinant of how long the e⁄ects
of the shock will persist. When ￿ = 1, the process is in￿nitely persistent since, given a shock, we
expect in￿ ation never to revert to its initial value. When ￿ = 0, in￿ ation is white noise and there is no
persistence. In between, 0 < ￿ < 1, the higher is ￿, then the longer ￿ to ￿rst approximation ￿ it will
take for in￿ ation to come back to the original level, after a shock.
However, Phillips (1991), Andrews (1993a), Andrews and Chen (1994) and Pivetta and Reis (2007),
criticise this measure of persistence. The main point of criticism is that the shape of the IRF depends
on all the roots of the equation, not just the largest one. Hence, this statistic is a very poor summary of
the impulse response function. According to Andrews and Chen (1994) and Marques (2004) ￿ is more
informative than the largest AR root as a measure of overall persistence. Despite this drawback, the
largest AR root is still widely used as a measure of persistence. Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) argue
that the largest AR root has intuitive appeal as a measure of in￿ ation persistence, as it determines
the size of the impulse response,
￿￿t+j
￿"t , as j grows large. The other reason being that an asymptotic
theory has been developed and appropriate software is available so that it is quite easy to compute
asymptotically valid con￿dence intervals for the corresponding estimates.
Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) also show how the volatility of in￿ ation can be decomposed into two
sources: one due to the variance of the shocks to the autoregression and the other due to the propagation
of shocks through autoregressive dynamics. The measure they use is the ratio of the total variance of
in￿ ation series to the variance of shocks to the autoregression:
V ar(￿t)
V ar("t)
When the ratio is only slightly above unity, then that is consistent with a white noise process for the
in￿ ation series. If the ratio is nearer or above 2.0 then it means that the volatility of in￿ ation contains
a substantial propagation component.
Our approach here employs the ￿nite-order ARMA representation of a time-series, from which the
above in￿nite order AR representation can be derived. We show below that our two structural models
imply an ARMA form for the in￿ ation solution. To test each, we will set it up as the null hypothesis;
under this hypothesis the ￿nal form is an ARMA, hence it is the appropriate representation. In an
ARMA, the AR parameters indicate the pure length of time that whatever e⁄ect is left, after the MA
coe¢ cients have worked themselves out, takes to die out. The MA coe¢ cients may e⁄ectively ￿ cancel￿
the e⁄ect of persistence coming from the AR coe¢ cients so that this e⁄ect left over is small ￿ thus
indicating low persistence.
In the analysis below we measure the degree of persistence of the in￿ ation process directly from the
impulse response function (IRF) estimated from the best-￿tting ARMA process. To obtain a single
measure of persistence from the IRF we ￿nd the ￿rst order autoregressive parameter ￿ that generates an
IRF closest by least squares to the actual IRF. As will be seen below there is virtually no ambiguity in
this measure of persistence in the in￿ ation IRFs we ￿nd here.
3 Estimating time-series models on UK data
We begin by looking at the empirical evidence on UK in￿ ation, carefully separating the data into periods
of di⁄erent regimes. We note that ￿ persistence￿is not entirely a clear concept. A stationary time-series
will typically consist of AR and MA; we con￿ne ourselves to linear processes since the role of non-
linearity seems to be basically secondary in this context. Persistence could naturally refer to the AR
roots, ignoring the MA, which by construction must end sharply. However, the MA component can
be inverted and turned into an in￿nite-order AR; this property is of course exploited in forming the
widely-used V AR representation. We may note that a variable can have high AR roots and yet the MA
terms may eliminate the e⁄ect of a shock after a period or two thus giving the high roots nothing to
￿ work on,￿so resulting in little or no persistence. Such appears to be the case with in￿ ation in at least
some of the periods we deal with.
According to the simple models within which we organise our thinking, the in￿ ation process invariably
has one or more AR roots, contributed by the exogenous error processes, as well as MA terms, which
result from the same processes. These seem to be critical in determining the extent of persistence; the
monetary regime e⁄ectively operates in this MA part, dampening or not the direct e⁄ect of shocks
on in￿ ation. Thus basically the AR roots in our model re￿ ect the more-or-less constant persistence of
5exogenous error processes, while the MA terms re￿ ect the activity of monetary reactions in ￿ closing
down￿such persistence in in￿ ation, or not, as the regime dictates. In estimation we allow the data to
determine the best-￿tting process.
We estimate the degree of persistence in UK data regime by regime, in line with our brief earlier
discussion of regimes which we elaborate in section 4 below. In￿ ation is calculated as quarter-on-quarter
in￿ ation annualised. It turns out that in each regime in￿ ation is a stationary process. Further, as
in￿ ation is quarter-on-quarter one has to take into account seasonality, which we have done by using
seasonal dummies. We begin by testing for the regime breakpoints of our theory above and examining
the di⁄erences in mean in￿ ation across the regimes. We then estimate the best-￿tting ARMA processes
for each regime and draw out its impulse response characteristics.
Plainly, the question of regime breaks is of the utmost importance for our subsequent analysis. Our
regime identi￿cation is supported by a wealth of narrative evidence, detailed below. Thus the break-up
of Bretton Woods and the UK￿ s shift into ￿ oating is a matter of historical record; as were both the
introduction of monetary targeting in 1979 and of in￿ ation targeting in 1992. The period of ￿ exchange
rate targeting￿from 1986 until the 1992 exit from the ERM is also well documented. Nevertheless, it
could be questioned whether there was statistical evidence from the macro time-series supporting the
existence of these regime breaks. For this purpose we look at the evidence from the three endogenous
macro variables identi￿ed in our models: output, in￿ ation and the short-term interest rate. We estimate
a VAR in the stationarised values of each viz, ￿log(output), in￿ ation and ￿(interest rate). Using the
method of Qu and Perron (2007), we split the sample into three overlapping 20-year sub-samples that
each contain two breaks according to our narrative analysis; this split was for computational reasons as
running the whole sample in one proved to be too computationally burdensome for the programme to
solve. The sub-samples were 1965-85; 1975-95 and 1985-2003. We looked for breaks in both parameters
and covariance matrices. The results are reported in Table 1 which shows when each regime ends and
the 95% con￿dence interval.
Assumed end Estimated 95% Con￿dence Interval
of regime Lower Upper
Bretton Woods (1965-85) 1970Q4 1972Q2 1972Q1 1975Q3
Incomes Policy (1965-85) 1978Q4 1981Q3 1978Q1 1982Q1
(1975-95) 1978Q4 1979Q3 1978Q2 1980Q1
Money Targeting (1975-95) 1985Q4 1990Q2 1988Q3 1990Q3
(1985-2003) 1985Q4 1990Q2 1990Q1 1990Q3
Exchange Rate (1985-2003) 1992Q3 1994Q1 1993Q1 1994Q3
Targeting
Table 1: Qu-Perron Structural Break Test
These tests generally con￿rm the existence of the assumed breaks and place them reasonably close to
the assumed break date. They place the end of regimes rather later than we have assumed, in all cases.
However for Incomes Policy the date lies within the 95% con￿dence interval and for Exchange Rate
Targeting it is within a couple of quarters of it. The main one where the evidence disagrees materially
is on the break between Monetary Targeting and Exchange Rate Targeting where it puts it in 1988-1990
against the end of 1985 as assumed here. Thus it con￿rms the existence of a break from Monetary to
Exchange Rate targeting but puts it two years later. Since In￿ ation targeting starts soon after, this
would imply that the Exchange rate targeting regime was rather brief, e⁄ectively con￿ned to the period
of formal membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. On this particular point we decided to allow
the narrative evidence to stretch the Exchange Rate targeting sample to include the previous couple
of years where there is known to have been ￿ shadowing￿of the ERM, with an expressed target for the
sterling-deutschemark rate.
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of in￿ ation for the di⁄erent regimes (annualised
quarterly rates of change, in fractions per annum).
The high water mark of in￿ ation both in mean and variance was the Incomes Policy period of the
1970s. This followed the relatively tranquil period of Bretton Woods; and it was in turn followed by
the period of Monetary Targeting when in￿ ation was brought down dramatically. During the Exchange
Rate Targeting regime it fell further; this was a period containing a severe recession also. At its end
there again followed a period of relative tranquillity, under the new In￿ ation Targeting regime.
The best-￿tting ARMA equation for each regime was chosen under the criterion of parsimony. Start-
6Regime Mean Standard Deviation




IT (RPI) 0:024982 0:025131
Full Sample 0:062063 0:064810
Table 2: Summary statistics of in￿ ation (annualised quarterly rates, fractions per annum)
ing with ARMA(1,0) we ￿rst raised the order of MA by one and then that of the AR by one, and so on
upwards, each time doing an F-test to test (at 99%) whether the more parsimonious model was a valid
restriction. The order was raised only if we reject the null hypothesis of a valid restriction. These tests
can be seen in Table 3, the resulting parameters in Table 4: and the IRFs in Figure 1. In all cases the
ARMA was of maximum order two, while in three cases we selected AR(1).
F-Test for Restriction
FUS/Bretton Woods IP MT5 FGR/ERM IT (RPI)
ARMA(1,0)!ARMA(1,1) 6:862936￿ 0:681275 19:298391￿ 0:003338 0:693967
ARMA(1,0)!ARMA(2,0) 1:282354 0:749222 7:106008￿ 0:013357 0:332882
ARMA(2,0)!ARMA(2,1) 0:103106
Table 3: F-Tests to Find Best-Fitting ARMA
Di⁄erent Monetary Regimes

















￿ R2 0:352409 0:565766 0:596308 0:630215 0:697537
S.E. of regression 0:027094 0:053893 0:046768 0:025569 0:013821
AIC ￿4:281325 ￿2:861028 ￿3:099847 ￿4:329306 ￿5:618613
SIC ￿4:068176 ￿2:632006 ￿2:814374 ￿4:089336 ￿5:415864
N.B. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors:
Table 4: Best Fitting ARMAs for UK Monetary Policy Regimes
Below the IRFs in Figure 1 we show ￿ where the ARMA order is higher than AR(1) ￿ the ￿rst order
autoregression, ￿; that ￿ts best: the ￿ whose IRF minimises the sum of least-squares deviations from
the actual IRF. Summarising these results, we ￿nd very low persistence under Bretton Woods and again
under Money Targeting and In￿ ation Targeting, but the two other regimes exhibit high persistence. We
now turn to the speci￿cation and calibration of the New Keynesian and New Classical models within
each regime we have identi￿ed.
4 The Structural Model ￿ with New Keynesian or New Clas-
sical Phillips curve
The objective of this section is to set out simple models with varying price stickiness, derived from micro-
foundations in for example the manner of Ireland (1994), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and McCallum
and Nelson (1999, 2000). Appendix C shows the steps in detail, and derives a basic template for each
model/regime; the models in the text are based on these. For simplicity we will distinguish between
sticky-price ￿ New Keynesian￿models, based on Calvo contracts and ￿ exible-price ￿ New Classical￿models
with a simple one-quarter information lag. The root model is identical between New Keynesian and New
Classical, apart from the Phillips Curve and the information assumptions (there is an information lag in
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ARMA(1,1) AR(1) [-0.062]
Figure 1: Impulse Response Function (Best-Fitting ARMA, and closest AR(1) representation)
three degrees of stickiness: high (with a strong backward-looking element), medium (where backward
and forward-looking elements are of similar size) and low (with the forward-looking element is dominant).
In all the models the ￿rst equation is the IS curve of the expectational variety that includes Etyt+1
as in Kerr and King (1996), McCallum and Nelson (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).6 This
modi￿cation imparts a dynamic, forward-looking aspect to saving behaviour and leads to a model of
aggregate demand that is tractable and also usable with a wide variety of aggregate supply speci￿cations.
This optimising IS function can be regarded as a transformation of the structural consumption Euler
equation, with the market-clearing condition for output substituted into it; the error term captures
stochastic movements in government spending, exports etc. In the case of ￿xed exchange rate regimes7
we have an additional expenditure switching e⁄ect in the IS curve.
The second equation in the models is the New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve. The former
is derived from Calvo contract price-setting with the addition of backward-looking indexation. The latter
can be regarded as the equation of a clearing labour market equating the marginal product of labour
with the Euler equation for labour supply, with a one-period information lag among households creating
the in￿ ation surprise term.
The last set of equations relate to monetary policy. Under ￿xed exchange rates the Euler equation
for household choice of foreign versus home bonds creates the equation of uncovered interest parity; with
the nominal exchange rate ￿xed, in￿ ation at home changes the real exchange rate and this feeds into net
exports and the real interest rate and so the IS curve. Under ￿ oating exchange rates we identify three
variants of policy: one with no nominal anchor and an incomes policy which we model directly, one with
monetary targeting and a demand for money, and one with direct setting of interest rates through a
Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule (￿ in￿ ation targeting￿ ).
Nelson (2000) provides estimates for the UK of the Taylor rule for several di⁄erent monetary regimes
in the period 1972-97; prior to the Bank of England receiving operational independence.8 His results
suggest that prior to 1992, it is di¢ cult to characterise UK monetary policy using a standard Taylor
rule. During these regimes policy makers were constantly changing the rules, what they were targeting
and the targets themselves. In this chapter we impose the restrictions that we think existed in those
periods.9 Thus our models can be thought of as simple approximations of actual policy behaviour during
6Fane (1985) and Koenig (1989, 1993a, 1993b) represent previous e⁄orts in the same direction. However, they only
show that some comparative-static properties of their models are like those of an IS-LM setup. Speci￿cally, they do not
develop dynamic equations analogous to IS and LM functions, as in McCallum and Nelson (1997). Auerbach and Kotliko⁄
(1995) derive IS and LM equations from an overlapping generations framework under the very restrictive assumption of
rigid prices.
7The period of Bretton Woods and shadowing the Deutsch Mark.
8In a famous paper, Taylor (1993) showed that US monetary policy after 1986 is well characterised by a rule for the
Federal Funds rate whereby the interest rate responds to output gap and in￿ation deviation from target. There has
subsequently been an explosion of theoretical and empirical work in this area. See for example Clarida et al. (2000)
9For our choice of regime dates see Minford (1993), Nelson (2000) and Budd (2002).
8each regime.
We set all the models out ￿rst with a New Classical Phillips Curve. These are our New Classical
models. In a succeeding subsection we set out the New Keynesian equivalents.
4.1 Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (US) or Bretton Woods (1956:1 TO 1970:4)
Our ￿rst regime is the Bretton Woods ￿xed exchange rate system. This is not easy to model because
of its progressive deterioration in the 1960s when ￿ one-o⁄￿exchange rate changes became commonplace
means of adjustment. Another important factor causing change was the progressive dismantling of
direct controls ￿ including a relaxation of controls on international capital ￿ ows ￿ which, while certainly
adding to the potential macro-economic bene￿ts from international economic activity, undoubtedly made
￿xed exchange rates inherently more di¢ cult to sustain. Furthermore, countries within the system came
to attach di⁄erent priorities to in￿ ation and unemployment as the immediate objective of policy. There
was also disagreement about how the burden of domestic policy adjustment should be shared between
surplus and de￿cit countries, including the US, the country of the anchor currency. The system eventually
collapsed under the weight of the out￿ ows from the US dollar, which, under the parity system, had to
be taken into other countries￿o¢ cial reserves, on such a scale that the dollar￿ s o¢ cial convertibility into
gold had eventually to be formally suspended in 1971.
Here we have made drastic simpli￿cations, ignoring parity changes and assuming a high degree of
capital mobility throughout. Equations (1) and (3)￿(7) when put together are the IS or demand side of





yt+1) ￿ ￿(Rt ￿ EtPt+1 + Pt) + ￿(EtNXt+1) + uFUSt (1)
￿
yt = ￿(Pt ￿ Et￿1Pt) + vFUSt (2)
NXt = aFUS0QFUSt + aFUS1yF
FUSt (3)
QFUSt = SFUSt + P
f
FUSt ￿ Pt (4)
Rt = RF
FUSt + (EtSFUSt+1 ￿ SFUSt) (5)
SFUSt = SFUS (6)
RF
FUSt = ￿FUSRF
FUSt￿1 + ￿FUSt (7)
uFUSt = ￿FUS0uFUSt￿1 + "FUSt (8)
vFUSt = ￿FUS1vFUSt￿1 + xFUSt (9)
yF
FUSt = ￿FUS4yF





FUSt￿1 + ￿FUSt (11)
In the equations above,
￿
yt is the output gap de￿ned as logGDP ￿ logGDPtrend, Rt the nominal
interest rate is the Bank of England base rate, Pt is the price level, NXt is net exports, QFUSt is the real
exchange rate, SFUSt is the nominal exchange rate de￿ned as £/$, P
f
FUSt is the US price level (CPI),
yF
FUSt is US GDP which is used as a proxy for world income and RF
FUSt is the US federal funds rate
(nominal). Equations (1) and (2) are based on aggregate demand and supply speci￿cations that are
designed to re￿ ect rational optimising behaviour on the part of the economy￿ s private actors. Equation
(1) is a forward looking open economy IS curve. The error term uFUSt can be interpreted as the demand
shock to the economy which we have modelled as an AR(1) process. Equation (2) is a standard New
Classical Phillips Curve where vFUSt is the productivity shock modelled as an AR(1). Equation (3)
simply puts forth the idea that the net exports of a country is a function of the real exchange rate and
the world income. If the real exchange rate appreciates or the world income is higher, then there would
be a greater demand for the domestic exports. Equation (4) is the de￿nition of real exchange rate and
equation (5) is the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) condition. Equation (6) simply states that the
nominal exchange rate is ￿xed, as we are in a ￿xed exchange rate regime. We have modelled the world
interest rate, GDP and prices as an AR(1) process. The error terms in equation (7) to (11) are all i:i:d:
The solution for in￿ ation is an ARMA whose order of both AR and MA components in principle
depends on the number of error processes identi￿ed. Appendix C shows the method of derivation for
this and other regimes, for both models.
94.2 Incomes Policy Regime (1971:1 to 1978:4)
Sterling was ￿ oated in June 1972.10 1972 was also the year of the Heath government￿ s ￿ U-turn￿in macro-
economic policy. The view of the government was that it could stimulate output and employment through
expansionary monetary and ￿scal policies, while at the same time keeping in￿ ation under control through
statutory wage and price controls.11 The opinion of the day was that the break-out of in￿ ation in the
1970s largely re￿ ected autonomous wage and price movements, and that the appropriate policy response
was to take actions that exerted downward pressure on speci￿c products, rather than to concentrate on
a monetary policy response. Examples of non-monetary attempts to control in￿ ation included statutory
incomes policy announced in November 1972 and the voluntary incomes policy pursued by the Labour
government from 1974; the extension of food subsidies in March 1974 budget; and the cuts in indirect
taxation in the July 1974 mini-Budget.
From late 1973 policy makers did start paying heed to the growing criticism of rapid money growth
that they had permitted. However, there was an unwillingness to make the politically unpopular decision
of raising nominal interest rates. The Bank of England was given instructions from the Government that
the growth of broad money, the Sterling M3 aggregate, was to be reduced ￿ however, the nominal interest
rates must not be increased. The result was the ￿ Corset,￿the introduction of direct quantitative control
on £M3, which imposed heavy marginal reserve requirements if increases in banks￿deposits exceeded
a limit. While this control did result in a reduction in the observed £M3 growth, it did so largely by
encouraging the growth of deposit substitutes, distorting £M3 as a monetary indicator and weakening
its relationship with future in￿ ation.12 For the rest of the 1970s monetary policy often looked restrictive
as measured by £M3 growth, but loose as measured by interest rates or monetary base growth.
In July 1976 targets were announced for £M3 monetary aggregate.13 From then on UK had a
monetary policy that reacted to monetary growth and to the exchange rate. Depreciation of the exchange
rate in 1976 was a major factor that triggered a tighter monetary policy during 1976-1979. However, we
must not over emphasise the monetary tightness as the nominal interest rate was cut aggressively ￿by
more than 900 basis points from late 1976 to early 1978 ￿ ahead of the fall in in￿ ation from mid-1977 to
late 1978. Re￿ ecting the easier monetary policy, money base (£M0) growth, which had been reduced to
single digits in the late 1977, rose sharply and peaked at more than 18% in July 1978; in￿ ation troughed
at 7.6% in October 1978 and continued to rise until May 1980, when it was 21%. Furthermore, the
nominal Treasury bill rate from July 1976 to April 1979 averaged 9.32%. In real terms it was well below
zero, indicating the continued tendency of the policy makers until 1978 to hold nominal interest rates
well below the actual and prospective in￿ ation rate.14
Nelson (2000) ￿nds that the estimated long-run response of the nominal interest rate to in￿ ation was
well below unity during the 1970s. Moreover, the real interest rate was permitted to be negative for
most of the period. These results suggest that UK monetary policy failed to provide a nominal anchor
in the 1970s. However, we note that there was a determinate in￿ ation rate during this period, even
though there was clearly no orthodox monetary anchor. What we have chosen to do from a modelling
viewpoint is treat Incomes Policy as the determinant of in￿ ation and to assume that interest rates ￿ ￿tted
in￿with what the model dictated was necessary to achieve that in￿ ation rate and the accompanying
output rate. Plainly this is a drastic over-simpli￿cation since interest rates were independently set at
quite inappropriate levels; however, introducing such contradictory monetary policy poses too much of a
modelling challenge for this exercise ￿ it could well be that there was such monetary indeterminacy, and
incomes policy so incredible, that we were here in a ￿ non-Ricardian￿period where ￿scal policy was left




yt+1) ￿ ￿(Rt ￿ Et￿t+1) + uIPt (12)
￿
yt = ￿(￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) + vIPt (13)
￿t = ￿t￿1(1 ￿ c) + ￿IPt (14)
10The ￿oat of the exchange rate was announced on the 23 June 1972. See Bank of England (1972).
11From 1973 to 1980, the government periodically used the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme, called the ￿ Corset,￿
as a quantitative control on the expansion of the banks￿balance sheets and therefore of the £ M3 monetary aggregate.
12As Nelson (2000) points out it is likely that this served prinicipally as a device for restricting arti￿cially the measured
growth of £ M3 without changing the monetary base or interest rates, rather than as a genuinely restrictive monetary policy
measure. See also Minford (1993).
13The value of this target was 11% from May 1976 to April 1978 and 10% from May 1978 to April 1970. These are the
mid-points of the successive targets announced for the annual £ M3 growth.
14Judd and Rudebusch (1998) report average real interest rate for the US for the period 1970-78 to be 2 basis points.
Hence, the phenomenon of low or negative real interest rates in the 1970s was more pronounced in the UK.
10uIPt = ￿IP0uIPt￿1 + "IPt (15)
vIPt = ￿IP1vIPt￿1 + xIPt (16)
￿IPt = ￿IP3￿IPt￿1 + ￿IPt (17)
In the equations above, ￿t is the in￿ ation quarter-on-quarter annualised and c is the incomes policy
restraint. As before equation (12) is a forward looking IS curve and equation (13) is a New Classical
Phillips curve. Equation (14) states that in￿ ation at time t is set by incomes policy at some fraction
of the actual in￿ ation in period t ￿ 1 but subject to an error, the ￿ break-down￿of policy, which we
have modelled as an AR(1). During this period there was a serious credibility problem. So, if the
government came along and announced that it would cut in￿ ation by 80 percent that simply would not
be believable. However, if the government announced that it would cut in￿ ation by say 20 percent then
that would de￿nitely be more credible and policy makers would be in a position to gradually get in￿ ation
expectations and hence in￿ ation under control. Furthermore, it should be remembered that during this
period there were no explicit targets. However, from policymakers￿behaviour we do know that there
existed implicit targets, and c helps us operationalise that. We have modelled the IS and PP forecast
error as AR(1) processes. "IPt; xIPt and ￿IPt are all i:i:d:
Substituting equation (17) in (14) the solution for ￿t in this regime is:
￿t = f￿IP3 + 1 ￿ cg￿t￿1 ￿ ￿IP3(1 ￿ c)￿t￿2 + ￿IPt (18)
The implied solution for in￿ ation is an AR(2).
4.3 Money Targeting Regime (1979:1 to 1985:4)
In 1979 in￿ ation was rising rapidly from an initial rate of over 10 percent. The policy of wage controls
that had been used to hold down in￿ ation in 1978 had crumbled in the ￿winter of discontent￿of that year
when graves went undug and rubbish piled up in the streets. The budget was in crisis, the de￿cit already
up to 5 percent of GDP and headed to get worse due to large public sector pay increases promised by the
previous government. Milton Friedman (1980) advised a gradual reduction in the money supply growth
rate and a cut in taxes in order to stimulate output. The ￿rst part was accepted, but the opinion was
that tax rates needed to remain high to try and reduce the de￿cit which was important in conditioning
￿nancial con￿dence.
As mentioned earlier monetary aggregate targeting was introduced in the UK in 1976 in conjunction
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) support arrangement. Figure 6 in the appendix plots the
growth of £M0 from 1970 till the end of 2003 and of £M3 from 1979 to 1985. The previous government
was quite successful in shrinking the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) from 10 percent
in 1975 to less than 4 percent in 1977. However, the policies lacked long-term durability. To achieve
durability policy was cast in the form of a Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), a monetary and
￿scal policy programme announced by the Conservative Government in its annual budget in 1980. This
strategy consisted ￿rst of a commitment to a ￿ve-year rolling target for gradually decelerating £M3.
Second, controls were removed, including the ￿Corset￿ , exchange controls and incomes policy. Third, the
monetary commitment was backed up by a parallel reduction in the PSBR/GDP ratio.
Large misses of the £M3 target were permitted as early as mid-1980, with the MTFS being heavily
revised in 1982. In October 1985 £M3 targeting was abandoned. It was however clear prior to the
abandonment that key policy makers did not regard overshoots of the £M3 target as intolerable, as long
as other measures of monetary conditions, such as interest rates or monetary base growth, were not
indicating that monetary policy was loose. Formally, monetary targets continued to be a part of the
MTFS right until 1996. However, by 1988, the targets had been so de-emphasised in monetary policy
formation that Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer could say ￿As far as monetary policy is
concerned, the two things perhaps to look at are the interest rate and the exchange rate.￿ 15
Even though the logic behind the MTFS was well developed, it failed not only to command credibility,
but also to be carried out in its own literal terms. Policy turned out to be more ￿ercely contractionary
than gradualism had intended. As Minford (1993) puts it succinctly ￿The paradox was: tougher yet less




yt+1) ￿ ￿rt + uMTt (19)
15Testimony, 30 November 1988, in Treasury and Civil Service Committee.
11￿
yt = ￿(Pt ￿ Et￿1Pt) + vMTt (20)
Mt = Pt ￿ ￿MT4Rt + ￿MT5(Et
￿
yt+1) + ￿MT;0t (21)
￿Mt = M + ￿MT;1t (22)
Rt = rt + EtPt+1 ￿ Pt (23)
uMTt = ￿MT0uMTt￿1 + "MTt (24)
vMTt = ￿MT1vMTt￿1 + xMTt (25)
￿MT;0t = ￿MT6￿MT;0t￿1 + ￿MTt (26)
In the equations above, rt is the real interest rate and Mt is the money demand (or supply). Equations
(19) and (20) are the IS and Phillips curve, respectively. Equation (21) the LM curve sets out a standard
money demand schedule. The shock to money demand is persistent as seen in equation (26). Growth in
money supply equals a exogenously speci￿ed target M 16and a random shock (equation (22)). Equation
(23) is the de￿nition of nominal interest rate in the model. As before the IS and PP curve shocks have
been modelled as AR(1) processes. "MTt, xMTt and ￿MTt are all i:i:d:
4.4 Exchange Rate Targeting (1986:1 to 1992:3)
The next regime largely consists of informal linking of the Sterling to the Deutsche Mark (DM). This
includes not only the ￿shadowing￿ of the DM in 1986-88, but also the period from autumn 1990 during
which UK was a formal member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The idea essentially was
that, just as the other major European currencies were successfully aiming to hold in￿ ation down by
anchoring their currencies to the DM within the ERM, the UK too could lock in to Germany￿ s enviable
record of sustained low in￿ ation even without actually joining the mechanism. The approach was never
formally announced, but it became clear in practice that the Sterling/DM exchange rate, which had
depreciated very sharply from DM 4 in July 1985 to DM 2.74 in early 1987, was not subsequently
allowed to appreciate above DM 3 even though this meant a massive increase in UK foreign exchange
reserves, and a reduction of interest rates from 11 percent to a trough of 7 percent during 1987 to prevent
the appreciation. This had the e⁄ect of accommodating and aggravating the in￿ ationary consequences
of the earlier depreciation.
In the Spring of 1988, the exchange rate cap was lifted but by then the boom was already entrenched.
Interest rates were pushed up to 15 percent by the Autumn of 1989 to bring the situation under control.
A year later the UK also formally joined the ERM. The episode produced a painful recession in which
in￿ ation which had risen to over 7% fell back sharply. According to Nelson (2000) from 1987-1990, the
Bundesbank￿ s monetary policy, rather than a domestic variable, served as UK monetary policy￿ s nominal
anchor.
At the time of ERM entry UK policy needs appeared to coincide with those of its partners. In principle
it seemed possible that with the enhanced policy credibility that ERM membership was expected to bring,
UK could hope to complete the domestic economic stabilisation programme with lower interest rates than
otherwise, and so at less cost in terms of loss of output. There was also a very strong non-monetary
consideration, that the UK would have little in￿ uence on the outcome of the European Inter-Government
Conference if it was not in the ERM.
However, things did not go as planned. German reuni￿cation meant that Germany needed to maintain
a tight monetary policy at a time when the domestic situation in a number of ERM countries, including
the UK, required monetary easing. Parity adjustment was against the ERM rules and seemed inconsistent
with maintaining policy credibility. The UK was then confronted with a situation where tightening policy
by raising rates made no economic sense in terms of domestic conditions. It then sought to maintain
the parity through intervention in the hope that the pressures in Germany would abate. In reality those
pressures did not ease soon enough and after heavy intervention, and a last bout of interest rate increases,
the UK had no choice but to withdraw from the ERM in September 1992.
The model we use here is the same as the Bretton Woods model with the exception that Germany




yt+1) ￿ ￿(Rt ￿ EtPt+1 + Pt) + ￿(EtNXt+1) + uFGRt (27)
￿
yt = ￿(Pt ￿ Et￿1Pt) + vFGRt (28)
16We assume M = 0 for convenience.
12NXt = aFGR0QFGRt + aFGR1yF
FGRt (29)
QFGRt = SFGRt + P
f
FGRt ￿ Pt (30)
Rt = RF
FGRt + (EtSFGRt+1 ￿ SFGRt) (31)
SFGRt = SFGR (32)
RF
FGRt = ￿FGRRF
FGRt￿1 + ￿FGRt (33)
uFGRt = ￿FGR0uFGRt￿1 + "FGRt (34)
vFGRt = ￿FGR1vFGRt￿1 + xFGRt (35)
yF
FGRt = ￿FGR4yF





FGRt￿1 + ￿FGRt (37)
Here SFGRt is the nominal exchange rate $=DM, RF
FGRt is the German nominal interest rate (day-
to-day money rate) and P
f
FGRt is the German price level (CPI).
4.5 In￿ ation Targeting Regime (1992:4 to 2003:3)
Immediately following the UK￿ s exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992,
in￿ ation expectations were between 5 percent and 7 percent at maturities 10 to 20 years ahead ￿ well
above the in￿ ation target of 1-4 percent at the time. Five years into the regime, by April 1997, in￿ ation
expectations had ratcheted down to just over 4 percent. A credibility gap still remained but it had
narrowed markedly. The announcement of operational independence for the Bank of England in May
199717 caused a further decline in in￿ ation expectations by around 50 basis points across all maturities.
By the end of 1998, in￿ ation expectations were around the UK￿ s 2.5 percent in￿ ation target, at all
maturities along the in￿ ation term structure. They have remained at that level since then.
Using the in￿ ation target as a reference point for expectations is important during the transition
to low in￿ ation as the target then serves as a means of guiding in￿ ation expectations downwards over
time. It is widely thought, though not a feature of our models here, that lags in policy mean that
in￿ ation-targeting needs to have a forward-looking dimension. According to Haldane (2000) a successful
in￿ ation-targeting regime must have ￿ ghostbusting￿ as an underlying theme; by which he means that
policy makers take seriously the need to be pre-emptive in setting monetary policy, o⁄setting incipient
in￿ ationary pressures.18 Nevertheless within our model here a forward element makes no sense and in




yt+1) ￿ ￿(Rt ￿ Et￿t+1) + uITt (38)
￿
yt = ￿(￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) + vITt (39)
Rt = ￿IT0 + ￿IT1Rt￿1 + ￿IT2(￿t ￿ ￿￿) (40)
uITt = ￿IT0uITt￿1 + "ITt (41)
vITt = ￿IT1vITt￿1 + xITt (42)
In the equations above all variables are as de￿ned earlier; ￿￿ is the in￿ ation target of the Bank of
England. Rt the nominal interest rate is the Bank of England base rate is plotted in Figure 6 in the
appendix. As before equation (38) and (39) are the IS and Phillips curve, respectively. Equation (40) is
a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. As before the IS and PP errors have been modelled as AR(1)
processes. "ITt, xITt are i:i:d:
17Autonomy of the Bank is enshrined in the Bank of England Act of 1998. This act confers instrument-independence
on the Bank, though the government still sets the goals of policy. In the jargon, there is goal-dependence but instrument
independence.
18Haldane (2000) goes on to say ￿Like ghosts, these pressures will be invisible to the general public at the time policy
measures need to be taken. Claims of sightings will be met with widespread derision and disbelief. But the central bank￿ s
job is to spot the ghosts and to exorcise them early. A successful monetary policy framework is ultimately one in which
the general public is not haunted by in￿ationary shocks.￿
134.6 The New Keynesian versions and their calibration:
In order to convert our small models to New Keynesian form, we merely need to substitute the New
Keynesian Phillips curve for the New Classical Phillips Curve used above. This we write in the standard
way with backward indexation as:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + ￿
￿
yt + vit
where vit represents the error term for the ith regime.
This replaces the second equation in our New Classical model above, viz:
￿
yt = ￿(Pt ￿ Et￿1Pt) + vit
It is immediately apparent that, with the exception of the Incomes Policy regime where the solution
for in￿ ation remains the same, this raises the dynamic complexity of the solution greatly. There are now
several (two or more) forward roots as well as at least one backward root in each model￿ s characteristic
equation; all must be stable in order for the model to have a stable solution (see Minford and Peel,
2002, chapter 2). This requires numerical analysis: because of the complexity of the equations, it is not
possible to establish this analytically in any of these cases. We have therefore calibrated each model so
that it satis￿ed this stability condition when subjected to simulation analysis. In general we have found
this has meant keeping the value ￿, the forward-looking term in output in the IS curve, somewhat below
1; we have varied it from 1 according to the demands of stability.
Values for ￿, the forward-looking root in the Phillips Curve, can also produce a stability problem
if close to unity. As it happens the value of this parameter is hotly disputed in recent empirical work.
Thus Rudd and Whelan (2005), found the backward element predominant in ￿tting the in￿ ation data
at the single equation level and so set ￿ close to zero. Gali et al (2005) on the other hand argue on
the basis of their own instrumental variable estimation procedure that it should be close to unity. We
decided therefore to look at a range of values for ￿.
For ￿ we took the usual calibration in this literature of 0.2. For other parameters in both models,
we took values from Orphanides (1998), Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999), McCallum and Nelson
(1999a, 1999b), McCallum (2001), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Ball (1999) and Batini and Haldane
(1999). Details can be found in appendix B.
5 Comparing Models and Data using the Bootstrap
5.1 Estimating the error processes
In each of the models we estimate the AR coe¢ cients of the IS, Phillips Curve and, where applicable,
money demand shocks. As the solution itself is a function of the errors, we iterate; we get a ￿rst
approximation of the errors by using the calibrated parameter values along with the data in the IS/PP
curve equation and for the expectational variables the values given by the solution￿ s lagged terms ignoring
the errors.19 Once we have the shock data we run AR(1) on it, to get our ￿rst estimates of ￿0 and ￿1 in
the various models.20
To work out the ￿ true￿errors and ￿s we have used a rolling forecast programme. The programme
works as follows. Our ￿rst estimates of the ￿s enable it to work out the expectational variables in the
model. Using the expectational variables the model solves for the endogenous variables for the current
period and all periods in the future. The new error then is simply the di⁄erence between the left hand
side and right hand side of the original equation where actual data is plugged in for current and lagged
endogenous variables and the expected terms are from the current rolling forecast. Then it estimates
AR(1) on these new errors to get the new ￿s, which can then be used to work out the new expectational
variables. The model then solves again to get the new endogenous variables and then gets yet again a
new set of errors. This iterative procedure is repeated until the errors and ￿s converge to their ￿ true￿
values ￿ as if the expectations that are model derived were used in the ￿rst place.
In addition all exogenous variables (foreign interest rate, foreign GDP and foreign prices) have au-
toregressive processes estimated for them.
19This is clearly not ideal. However, it enables us to get some starting values of the errors.
20Please note that we have omitted the subscripts speci￿c to each regime. eg. ￿FUS0etc
146 Bootstrapping
We now replicate the stochastic environment for each model-regime combination to see whether within
it our estimated ARMA equations could have been generated. This we do via bootstrapping the models
above with their error processes.
The idea is to create pseudo data samples ￿ here 1000 ￿ for in￿ ation. Within each regime we
draw the vectors of i:i:d: shocks in our error processes with replacement;21 we then input them into
their error processes and these in turn into the model to solve for the implied path of in￿ ation over
the sample period. We then run ARMA regressions on all the pseudo-samples to derive the implied
95% con￿dence intervals for all the coe¢ cient values found. Finally we compare the ARMA coe¢ cients
estimated from the actual data to see whether they lie within these 95% con￿dence intervals: under the
null hypothesis of the model-regime being considered, these values represent the sampling variation for
the ARMA coe¢ cients. We also show a portmanteau statistic (the m[odel]-metric), the 95% con￿dence
limit for the joint distribution of the ARMA parameters; this is obtained by computing the Mahalanobis
distance of the joint parameters from their joint means. The bootstraps create a distribution of this
distance. The m-metric is then the percentile of this distribution given by the distance obtained from
the actual data; plainly if this exceeds 95% the model is rejected at the 95% con￿dence level. (Minford et
al, 2007 discusses these methods in much greater detail). Table 5 summarises the results of this exercise.
6.1 Results for the New Classical models:
Estimated 95% Con￿dence Interval M-metric
Lower Upper
Bretton Woods AR(1) ￿0:592304 ￿0:825237 0:930382 67:3
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206 ￿0:969678 1:296733
Incomes Policy AR(1) 0:727366 0:199370 0:737302 94:0
(IP)
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 ￿0:801210 0:968120 91:8
(MT) MA(1) ￿0:997381 ￿0:997490 1:531400
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 ￿0:222109 0:258290￿ 100:0
(FGR)
In￿ ation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 ￿0:208337 0:294338 79:7
(IT)
Table 5: Con￿dence Limits the New Classical Model for Theoretical ARMAs
It can be seen from Table 5 that the model is accepted as a whole (based on the m-metric) for all
regimes except for exchange rate targeting where the model falls well short of the estimated persistence.
The charts that follow show the impulse response functions with their 95% con￿dence intervals.
In￿ ation persistence is fairly low under Bretton Woods; rises as it moves to a ￿ oating regime with
incomes policy and then falls back sharply under monetary targeting ￿ this was the period of the
Thatcher government￿ s ￿ monetarist￿policies designed to squeeze high double-digit in￿ ation out of the
economy. Finally persistence rose again under exchange rate targeting until in￿ ation targeting pushed it
back down to the Bretton Woods level. The model fails as we have seen to generate enough persistence
under exchange rate targeting but otherwise captures the shifts from low to high persistence and then
back again to low. As we have seen, this is not because the persistence of the exogenous shocks changes
across regimes but rather because the regimes themselves alter the response of in￿ ation to this persistence.
6.2 Results for the New Keynesian models:
We now turn to the New Keynesian versions of the model. In the following tables we show the equivalent
bootstrap results. We group them into three: high stickiness (low-￿), medium, and low stickiness (high-￿):
21By drawing vectors for the same time period we preserve their contemporaneous cross-correlations. The errors also
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Figure 2: New Classical Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds
6.2.1 High stickiness (low-￿:)
The model is comprehensively rejected under all regimes (except Incomes Policy which is the same under
both models). The reason seems to be the high level of persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
itself, which is both forward-looking as in Calvo and also has a large backward-looking component.
This Phillips Curve was constructed to generate persistence: persistence is as it were ￿ engineered into￿
the in￿ ation process through it. However, the consequent di¢ culty is that policy regime changes have
insu¢ cient e⁄ect on the degree of persistence. In￿ ation targeting brings it down somewhat; but still
nowhere near enough.
Estimated 95% Con￿dence Interval M-metric
Lower Upper
Bretton Woods AR(1) ￿0:592304 0:651404￿ 0:917036 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206 0:014508 0:814515￿
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:589790 0:972620 99:3
(MT) MA(1) ￿0:997381 0:001890￿ 0:997420
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 0:803951￿ 0:996775 100:0
(FGR)
In￿ ation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 0:333518￿ 0:685009 99:9
(IT)
Table 6: Con￿dence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
These results indicate that the high-stickiness New Keynesian version of the model is rejected for all
four regimes (for Incomes Policy, ignored here, it is the same as the New Classical model and accepted).
As we saw earlier the NC version was only rejected for Exchange Rate Targeting.
In Appendix C we examine from the model solutions what exactly is driving the di⁄erences between
the two models. The New Keynesian model fails to ￿t the varying in￿ ation persistence data essentially
because persistence is ￿ hard-wired￿into its Phillips Curve which contains the high autoregressive root,
1 ￿ ￿. Without a policy response to in￿ ation, this backward root and the two forward roots (￿ and
￿) are the roots of the characteristic equation. This backward root can only be reduced by a powerful
in￿ ation response from interest rates that changes the con￿guration of all the roots in the characteristic
equation. However, only under in￿ ation targeting does this produce any material reduction and even
this is insu¢ cient to match the data. The result is that in all regimes, persistence is excessive compared
with the data.
By contrast, the new Classical model derives its in￿ ation persistence properties from the autoregres-
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Figure 3: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (high stickiness)
or it can o⁄set existing sources of persistence by reacting to an in￿ ation shock with a future in￿ ation
reduction ( as for example under In￿ ation targeting).
We can summarise the di⁄erence as that persistence in the New Keynesian model is set by the
autoregressive roots essentially produced by the Phillips Curve￿ s persistence, which can with di¢ culty be
changed by the monetary regime whereas persistence in the New Classical model is set by the combination
of largely ￿xed autoregressive roots coming from the exogenous processes and of a moving average process
much a⁄ected by the monetary policy regime.
6.2.2 Medium stickiness (￿: is 0.5)
When the size of the backward-looking root is brought down to around 0.5, the model￿ s implications
are for substantially less persistence. This allows it to match the Exchange Rate Targeting regime well
But although it gets closer to the persistence of the Monetary Targeting regime, it is still rejected and
is massively rejected for both Bretton Woods and In￿ ation Targeting.
Estimated 95% Con￿dence Interval M-metric
Lower Upper
Bretton Woods AR(1) ￿0:592304 0:255710￿ 0:991510 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206 ￿0:971190 0:746510￿
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:050886 0:906435 98:3
(MT) MA(1) ￿0:997381 ￿0:580258￿ 0:970441
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 0:523998 0:845061 63:6
(FGR)
In￿ ation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 0:596853￿ 0:819715 100:0
(IT)
Table 7: Con￿dence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
6.2.3 Low stickiness (￿:=0.9)
In this ￿nal version of the New Keynesian model the Phillips Curve is virtually entirely forward-looking,
with the least stickiness of any of these Calvo contract models. The model now matches the Money
Targeting and In￿ ation Targeting regimes but it is still too persistent for Bretton Woods and it is now
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Figure 4: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (medium stickiness)
Estimated 95% Con￿dence Interval M-metric
Lower Upper
Bretton Woods AR(1) ￿0:592304 0:853110￿ 0:983040 100:0
(FUS) MA(1) 0:952206 ￿0:997490 ￿0:421050￿
Money Targeting AR(1) 0:927892 0:191180 0:932391 77:3
(MT) MA(1) ￿0:997381 ￿0:93970￿ 0:633995
Exchange Rate Targeting AR(1) 0:623726 ￿0:274871 0:407777￿ 100:0
(FGR)
In￿ ation Targeting (RPI) AR(1) 0:202142 ￿0:247884 0:566936 63:5
(IT)
Table 8: Con￿dence Limits from the New Keynesian Model for Theoretical ARMAs
6.3 Comparing the models
The New Keynesian model in its most sticky form generates far too much persistence in all regimes. As
the backward-looking root is brought down, it is able to encompass up to two of the regimes only. The
persistence features in each case are largely ￿xed by the Phillips Curve, so that the regime itself has
limited in￿ uence on the model￿ s overall properties. With the New Classical model where the Phillips
Curve itself has merely a one-period information lag, the persistence properties come from the natural
autoregressiveness of the errors interacting with the regime. As the regime varies the basic autoregres-
siveness due to the errors is modi￿ed by the regime￿ s responses; this enables the model to encompass
most of the variation in persistence across regimes.
Thus if we ask which model version is the most likely, we can measure this by an overall likelihood.
In each regime the likelihood of observing the data-generated ARMA parameters, under the null of each
model, can be computed from the model￿ s probability density function (we assume this is multi-variate
normal by appeal to the central limit theorem since these parameters are sample means). The natural
logs of these pdfs are shown in Table 9 together with the sum across all regimes for each model. This
last ￿gure represents the log of the joint likelihood.
The Table shows that for all the regimes other than for exchange rate targeting the model with least
stickiness, the New Classical, is the most likely. This model is also the most likely overall. The next most
likely is the medium stickiness New Keynesian model; even though it is rejected in three out of the four
regimes, whereas the low stickiness version is only rejected in two, it avoids the disastrous performance
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Figure 5: New Keynesian Impulse Response Functions with 95% Bounds (low stickiness)
Targeting Regimes
Bretton Woods Monetary Exchange Rate In￿ ation Total
New Keynesian
High Stickiness ￿82:71 ￿17:94 ￿6:50 ￿2:16 ￿109:31 (￿26:6)+
Medium Stickiness ￿32:16 ￿10:48 0:86 ￿9:91 ￿51:69 (￿19:53)+
Low Stickiness ￿1 ￿0:79 ￿19:10 0:33 ￿1 (￿19:56)+
New Classical ￿2:69 ￿6:44 ￿7:12 0:45 ￿15:8 (￿13:11)+
+Numbers in parentheses correspond to the total for the last three regimes
Table 9: Log-likelihood of Observing the Data-Generated ARMA Parameters Under Each Model and
Regime
7 Conclusions
UK in￿ ation persistence varies strikingly across the many monetary regimes pursued in the UK during
the postwar period. It started low under Bretton Woods, then rose sharply during the next decade as the
exchange rate ￿ oated without a monetary anchor, fell to virtually nil under the succeeding monetarist
regime of the 1980s, before rising again to a high level when the pound was tied to the Deutschemark;
￿nally on the introduction of in￿ ation targeting from 1992 in￿ ation persistence dropped back again to the
level last seen under Bretton Woods. These facts cannot be accounted for easily by models of nominal
rigidity of the sort modelled in Calvo contracts with an element of lagged indexation. These models
e⁄ectively build persistence into the Phillips Curve and this degree of persistence is consequently not at
all sensitive to variations in the monetary regime. Thus not surprisingly they ￿nd it hard to match the
variation of persistence revealed in the facts. By contrast a model with minimal rigidity, such as the
￿ exprice model with a one-quarter information lag, ￿ New Classical￿in nature, has reasonable success in
picking up these variations. These models rely for in￿ ation persistence on the autoregressiveness in the
error processes themselves; however di⁄erent monetary regimes moderate this natural persistence more or
less. We conclude in short that in￿ ation persistence is not a constant resulting from the inherent nominal
rigidity of the monetary transmission process, but is rather the product of monetary policy interacting
with the natural autoregressiveness of exogenous processes and is best captured by models with little
nominal rigidity. Of course whether these models can also successfully address other macroeconomic
regularities has been questioned; but that is something we leave to later work. We hope merely to have
established in a Popperian way a negative ￿nding: namely that the facts of UK in￿ ation persistence
reject models of nominal rigidity but not models of minimal rigidity.
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228 Appendix A: Data
8.1 Data Set (Base year 2000)
1. UK Base Rate: Bank of England Base Rate % (EP). Series UKPRATE. in DataStream.
2. UK Gross Domestic Product: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Factor Cost £ millions. Seasonally
Adjusted. Series YBHH Table 1.1 Monthly Digest of Statistics.
3. UK M0: Wide Monetary Base. Seasonally Adjusted. Series AVAE Table 6.2 Economic Trends.
4. UK M4: Money Stock. Seasonally Adjusted. Series AUYN Table 6.2 Economic Trends.
5. UK Net Exports: Current Account Balance £ millions, O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS). Series
UKHBOG.. in DataStream. Calculated as fraction of GDP at Factor Cost.
6. UK RPI Price Index: Retail Price Index (RPI), O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS). Not Seasonally
Adjusted. Series UKRP....F in DataStream.
7. UK RPIX Price Index : Retail Price Index All items excluding Mortgage Payments, O¢ ce of
National Statistics (ONS). Not Seasonally Adjusted. Series CHMK Table 3.1 Economic Trends.
8. Sterling/US Dollar: International Financial Statistics for UK. Inverse of Market Rate US Dollars
per Pound.
9. Sterling/Deutsche Mark: International Financial Statistics for Germany and UK. Used Market
Rate Deutsche Mark per US Dollar and Market Rate US Dollars per Pound to calculate.
10. US Gross Domestic Product: Gross Domestic Product (AR), Bureau of Economic Analysis. Series
USGDP...D in DataStream.
11. US Interest Rate: Federal Funds Rate %, Federal Reserve. Series USFEDFUN in DataStream.
12. US Price Index: Consumer Price Index (CPI) All Urban All Items, Bureau of Labour Statistics.
Not Seasonally Adjusted. Series USCONPRCF in DataStream.
13. German Gross Domestic Product: Gross Domestic Product, Deutsche Bank. Seasonally Adjusted.
Series BDGDP...D in DataStream.
14. German Interest Rate: Day-to-day Money Rate %, Eurostat. Series BDESSFRT in DataStream.
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Figure 6: Historical Data
248.3 APPENDIX A: Calibration and estimation:
8.4 Calibrated and Estimated Parameters of the Models
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Table 10: Calibrated Parameters
￿The ￿rst value shown is that used for the high stickiness version. the second for the medium and
low stickiness versions.
+These values are those used for the high stickiness cases; for medium stickiness the value was 0.5,
for low stickiness 0.9 in all regimes.
New Classical
Regime Estimated Parameters of errors and exogenous processes
￿(RF) ￿0(u) ￿1(v) ￿3(IP) ￿4(yF) ￿5(PF) ￿6(￿M)
Fixed Exchange Rate: US 0.958062 0.521085 0.717961 0.833633 1.0
(FUS)
Incomes Policy (IP) 0.575105 -0.05911 -0.211389
Money Targeting (MT) 0.345169 0.270198 0.908337
Fixed Exchange Rate: 0.990000 0.650013 0.722195 0.478226 1.0
Germany (FGR)





Fixed Exchange Rate: US 0.958062 0.968885 -0.338905
(FUS)
Money Targeting (MT) 0.003876 0.671948 0.075834
Fixed Exchange Rate: 0.990000 0.911366 -0.730040
Germany (FGR)
In￿ ation Targeting 0.502884 -0.392109
(IT) RPI
Table 11: Estimated Parameters of error processes
259 Appendix C: A Basic Open Economy DSGE Model ￿ the
derivation from it of the New Keynesian and New Classical
models
Consider an economy populated by identical in￿nitely lived agents who produce a single good as output
and use it both for consumption and investment. We assume that there are no market imperfections.
We have for ease of argument deleted all shocks from the model but shocks can easily be reintroduced
by making various of the ￿xed parameters stochastic; in principle this will be required as the model
is stochastic. At the beginning of each period ￿ t￿ , the representative agent chooses (a) the commodity
bundle necessary for consumption, (b) the total amount of leisure that she would like to enjoy, and (c)
the total amount of factor inputs necessary to carry out production. All of these choices are constrained
by the ￿xed amount of time available and the aggregate resource constraint that agents face. During the
period ￿ t￿ , the model economy is in￿ uenced by various random shocks.
In an open economy goods can be traded but for simplicity it is assumed that these do not enter
in the production process but are only exchanged as ￿nal goods. The consumption, Ct in the utility
function below is composite per capita consumption, made up of agents consumption of domestic goods,
Cd
t and their consumption of imported goods, C
f
t . We treat the consumption bundle as the numeraire
so that all prices are expressed relative to the general price level, Pt: The composite consumption utility

















where ! is the weight of home goods in the consumption function, ￿, the elasticity of substitution is
equal to 1
1+￿:
The consumer maximises this composite utility index, given that an amount f Ct has been chosen for
total expenditure, with respect to its components, Cd
t and C
f




t : Where pd
t
is the domestic price level relative to the general price level and Qt is the foreign price level in domestic
currency relative to the general price level (the real exchange rate and also the terms of trade). The





= [(1 ￿ !)]￿(Qt)￿￿ (44)
We also note that:















log(Qt) + constant (46)
In a stochastic environment a consumer is expected to maximise expected utility subject to the budget












; 0 < ￿ < 1 (47)





























at its maximum with the constraint binding L = f Ct so that @L
@ f Ct
= 1: Thus ￿ = 1 - the change in the utility index





(44) . 0 = @L
@Cd



































Ct from the previous two equations gives us
equation (45).
26where ￿ is the discount factor, Ct is consumption in period ￿ t￿ , Lt is the amount of leisure time
consumed in period ￿ t￿ , Mt
Pt is real money balances and E0 is the mathematical expectations operator.
The essential feature of this structure is that the agent￿ s tastes are assumed to be constant over time.
The objective of this paper is to specify a fully articulated model of an open economy which we
propose to calibrate/estimate using data for the UK. We use this model to explain the behaviour of real
exchange rate and also evaluate the impact of various demand and supply shocks.
9.1 The Representative Household
The model economy is populated by a large number of identical households who make consumption,
investment, and labour supply decisions overtime. Each households objective is to choose sequences of
consumption and hours of leisure that maximise its expected discounted stream of utility. We assume a







= ￿logCt + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)





where 0 < ￿ < 1, and ￿ > 0 is the leisure substitution parameter.
Individual economic agents view themselves as playing a dynamic stochastic game. Changes in
expectations about future events would generally a⁄ect current decisions. Each agent in our model is
endowed with a ￿xed amount of time which is spent on leisure Lt and/or work Nt. If Ht, total endowment
of time is normalised to unity, then it follows that
Nt + Lt = 1 or Lt = 1 ￿ Nt (49)
Furthermore for convenience in the logarithmic transformations we assume that approximately L = N
on average.















t = (1 ￿ ￿)vtNt + bt + Qtb
f






where pt denotes the real present value of shares, vt = Wt
Pt is the real consumer wage (wt, the producer
real wage, is the the wage relative to the domestic goods price level; so vt = wtpd
t). Labour income is
taxed at the rate ￿t, which includes all taxes on households and is assumed to be a stochastic process.
b
f
t denotes foreign bonds, bt domestic bonds, S
p




Pt is the real
exchange rate.
In a stochastic environment the representative agent maximizes the expected discounted stream of

















t = E0￿t (52)
E0 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Nt)











E0￿tpt = E0￿t+1(pt+1 + dt+1) (56)
Substituting equation (54) in (52)and letting t=0 yields :











27Now substituting (52) and (54) in (53) yields








Substituting out for vt = wtpd
t (and noting that Et logvt = logvt +logpue
t = logwt +logpd
t +logpue
t ;
where the ue superscript means ￿ unexpected￿ ) and using (46) equation (58) becomes






(1 ￿ ￿t) exp
￿
logwt ￿ (1￿!




















j=1 (1 + rt+j)
(61)
The above equation states that the present value of a share is simply discounted future dividends.
In small open economy models the domestic real interest rate is equal to the world real interest rate,
which is taken as given. Further, it is assumed that the economy has basically no e⁄ect on the world
rate because, being a small part of the world, its a⁄ect on the world savings and investment is negligible.
These assumptions imply that the real exchange rate for the small open economy is constant. However,
we are modelling a medium sized economy. In our set up the economy is small enough to continue with
the assumption that world interest rates are exogenous but large enough for the domestic rate to deviate
from the world rate. Hence, in our model real exchange rates are constantly varying.



















The government ￿nances its expenditure per capita, Gt, by collecting taxes on labour income, ￿t. Also,
it issues debt, bonds (bt) each period which pays a return next period.
The government budget constraint is:




where bt is real bonds.
9.3 The Representative Firm with ￿xed capital
Firms rent labour from households, who own their shares,and transform them into output according to
a production technology and sell consumption goods to households and government. The technology




where 0 < ￿ < 1, Yt is aggregate output per capita and Zt re￿ ects the state of technology.
28In a stochastic environment the ￿rm maximizes present discounted stream, V , of cash ￿ ows, subject




di(Yt+i ￿ wt+iNt+i) (66)





9.4 The Foreign Sector
From equation (2) we can derive the import equation for our economy
logC
f
t = logIMt = ￿ log(1 ￿ !) + logCt ￿ ￿ logQt (68)
Now there exists a corresponding equation for the foreign country which is the export equation for
the home economy




t + ￿F logQt (69)










tEXt ￿ QtIMt (70)
9.5 Complete listing:
The above set-up can now be consolidated into a model listing as follows:
Behavioural Equations
(1) Consumption Ct ; solves for rt:








or Ct = ￿Ct+1 ￿ ￿rt + c1
In this linear, representation we use a ￿rst order Taylor series expansion around (average) Ct;EtCt+1,
where ￿ = ( Ct
EtCt+1) and ￿ = ￿￿Ct and we would typically assume it to be less than unity on the grounds
of growth. By dividing both sides by Ct, we can approximate this linear expression by
logCt = ￿Et logCt+1 ￿ ￿￿rt + c2
(2) Demand for money: log Mt
Pt = Et logCt+1 ￿ log￿ ￿ log(rt + Et￿t+1)
(3) UIP condition:
rt = rF
t + Et logQt+1 ￿ logQt + c3
where rF is the foreign real interest rate; here we use the property in taking logs that for a lognormal
variable xt;Et logxt+1 = logEtxt+1 ￿ 0:5￿2
log x:Thus the constant c3 contains the variance of logCt+1:
(4) Production function Yt:
Yt = Zt(Nt)￿ or
logYt = ￿logNt + logZt







logNt = log￿ + logYt ￿ logwt
(6) The producer wage is derived by equating demand for labour, Nt, to the supply of labour
given by the consumer￿ s ￿rst order conditions:






(1 ￿ ￿t) exp
￿
logwt ￿ (1￿!

















where Qt is the real exchange rate, (1 ￿ !)
￿ is the weight of domestic prices in the CPI index.
(7) Imports IMt:
logIMt = ￿ log(1 ￿ !) + logCt ￿ ￿ logQt
(8) Exports EXt:




t + ￿F logQt
Budget constraints, market-clearing and transversality conditions:
(9) Market-clearing condition for goods:
Yt = Ct + Gt + EXt ￿ IMt
and we assume the government expenditure share is an exogenous process.
The remainder of the model can be ignored for our purposes since we are now in a position to derive
the various equations of the New Classical model- viz IS, LM, and Phillips Curve. For this purpose we
will ignore the constants.
The IS curve:
To derive the IS curve note that loglinearising the market-clearing condition directly yields
logYt = clogCt + gt + x(logCF
t ￿ logCt) + x￿￿ logQt
where c is the share of consumption in GDP, x is the share of trade in GDP and .￿￿ = ￿+￿F: Hence
substituting for logCt from above yields:
logYt =
￿(c ￿ x)￿￿
1 ￿ ￿B￿1 rt + gt + xCF
t ￿ x￿￿ logQt
and multiplying through by 1 ￿ ￿B￿1 gives::
logYt = ￿￿￿rt + ￿EtYt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿B￿1)gt + x(1 ￿ ￿B￿1)logCF
t ￿ x￿￿(1 ￿ ￿B￿1)logQt
This is our IS curve.
The LM curve:
To obtain the LM curve we take (2) above and noting that Rt = rt + Et￿t+1obtain:
logMt ￿ logPt = Et logCt+1 ￿ log(Rt)
Using the loglinearised market-clearing condition above yields
Et logCt+1 = 1
c￿x(Et logYt+1 ￿ Etgt+1 ￿ xEt logCF
t+1 ￿ x￿￿Et logQt+1)
We now linearise logRt around R and substitute from the above to obtain:
log(Mt
Pt ) =  1Et logYt+1 ￿  2Rt + ￿t
where  1 = 1
c￿x and  2 = R
￿1
Here the error term ￿t = 1
c+x(￿Etgt+1 ￿ xEt logCF
t+1 ￿ x￿￿Et logQt+1)
30The New Classical Phillips Curve:
We obtain the New Classical Phillips Curve. We solve the 3 equations production function (4),
demand for labour (5), and supply of labour (6), ￿rst for expected (equilibrium) values, assuming logCt
is also at its expected value. Then we solve the same three equations for the e⁄ect of unexpected prices,
logPue
t (we assume consumption is smoothed to stay at its expected value). From the production function
we have logY ue
t = ￿logNue
t Hence from the demand for labour we have logNue
t = ￿ 1
1￿￿ logwue
t :




t ): So it follows that
logwue








t ): This is of course the ￿ surprise￿Phillips Curve:
logYt = logY ￿ +  (logPt ￿ Et logPt) where it has been assumed that households do not have
contemporaneous knowledge of the general price level.
The New Keynesian model:
We may take over all the equations derived above except the surprise Phillips Curve. We now assume
that households all have monopoly power in their particular product and set the price in Calvo contracts
but with lagged indexation. The resulting pricing equation has been derived carefully in Le and Minford
(2006) for price-setting ￿rms with ￿xed capital and variable labour as
￿t = ￿(logYt ￿ logY ￿) + ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1
A similar form was derived by Christiano et al (2005). According to Le and Minford ￿ =
￿
1+￿ and
should therefore be just below one half. However this formulation assumes that every household indexes
prices up by last period￿ s price; di⁄erent assumptions on indexation will clearly change the formulation.
The speci￿cation e⁄ect of Fixed versus ￿ oating exchange rates:
Under ￿xed exchange rates the uncovered interest parity equation ties real interest rates to the relevant
foreign real interest rate while the money supply becomes endogenous and money demand redundant.
The real exchange rate is determined by in￿ ation and the relevant exogenous foreign in￿ ation. Thus
under ￿xed rates interest rates are substituted out in favour of exogenous foreign interest rates while the
real exchange rate is substituted out by the log of prices and of exogenous foreign prices.
Thus rt = rF
t + Et logQt+1 ￿ logQt; and logQt = logPF
t ￿ logPt. So the IS curve becomes:
logYt = ￿￿￿rF
t + ￿Et logYt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿B￿1)gt + x(1 ￿ ￿B￿1)logCF
t + [￿￿(1 ￿ B￿1) + x￿￿(1 ￿
￿B￿1)]logQt
where B￿1 is the forward operator instructing one to lead the variable, holding the date of the
expectation constant.
Since ￿ is less than unity the last term on the RHS becomes [￿￿ +x￿￿](1￿￿￿B￿1)(logPF
t ￿logPt),




Thus our IS curve under ￿xed rates becomes:
logYt = ￿Et logYt+1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿B￿1)(logPt) + vFXt
where the error term contains the remaining terms above; vFXt = ￿￿￿rF
t + (1 ￿ ￿B￿1)gt + x(1 ￿
￿B￿1)logCF
t + [￿￿ + x￿￿](1 ￿ ￿￿B￿1)logPF
t
and ￿ = ￿￿ + x￿￿
Under ￿ oating exchange rates uncovered interest parity allows the home interest rate (set by home
policy) to determine the real exchange rate (and hence also its expected future value) given exogenous
foreign interest rates. Thus we can substitute out the real exchange rate in terms of home and exogenous
foreign interest rates. using UIP again we have (1 ￿ B￿1)logQt = ￿(rt ￿ rF
t ): Noting that ￿ is close
to unity we may approximate (1 ￿ ￿B￿1)logQt as ￿(rt ￿ rF
t ):and remove (1 ￿ B￿1)logQt from the IS
curve in favour of rt ￿ rF
t , yielding an IS curve under ￿ oating rates of:
logYt = ￿Et logYt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
where again ￿ = ￿￿ + x￿￿
where the error term again contains the remaining terms in this case
vFLt = (1 ￿ ￿B￿1)gt + x(1 ￿ ￿B￿1)logCF
t + x￿￿rF
t
319.5.1 Summary of the IS/LM/Phillips Curve reduction and its solution method
Fixed Exchange Rate model:
(IS) yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿B￿1)(logPt] + vFXt
where yt is log detrended output and ￿ = ￿￿ + x￿￿
Under Fixed rates the LM curve is redundant. The model is completed by a Phillips Curve, either
New Keynesian
￿t = ￿(yt ￿ y￿) + ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + uKt
or New Classical
yt = ￿ logPue
t + uCt
Floating Exchange rate model:
(IS) yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
Now again there is either a New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve as above.
Finally there are di⁄ering regimes:
Either Incomes Policy:
(IP) ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + ct
Notice that in this regime the Incomes Policy equation bypasses the rest of the model, ￿ representing
the ￿ toughness￿of controls; needless to say such a control regime cannot be expected to last because it
could not inde￿nitely override market forces in the rest of the model; the e⁄ect of these is seen in the
error term ct. Nor does it of course, as the regime changes by the end of the decade.
Or Monetary Targeting
(MT) ￿mt = m + ￿t
with LM Curve
(LM) mt ￿ pt =  1Etyt+1 ￿  2Rt + ￿t
where mt = logMt;pt = logPt:
Or In￿ ation Targeting
(IT) Rt = {(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + it
Notice here no LM curve is required.
10 Solution method:
Incomes Policy: The solution is straightforwardly obtained by substituting the ct process.
3210.1 New Classical Models:
(a) Fixed rates Here the model is:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿B￿1)(logPt) + vFXt
and yt = ￿ logPue
t + uCt
We assume here the case where Etxt = E(xt j ￿t￿1) and for simplicity we set the error term in the
IS curve to zero. Let ut = ￿ut￿1 +￿t or ut = ￿t
1￿￿L where L is the lag operator; pt = logPt: The solution
is most easily obtained by taking expectations at t of the model and then adding on the unexpected
elements of each variable. Taking Et of the model yields:
(1 ￿ ￿￿B￿1)Etpt = ￿
￿1(￿B￿1 ￿ 1)Etut














Multiplying through by (1 ￿ ￿L) and di⁄erencing the equation gives us the in￿ ation solution:
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 ￿ ’1￿t + [’1(1 + ￿) ￿ ’2]￿t￿1 + (’2 ￿ ￿’1)￿t￿2




The solution in this simpli￿ed case where we have only one error is ARMA(1,2). Notice that the sum
of the two moving average terms has the value ’1 which is equal and opposite to the impact e⁄ect of
the error. Hence the Impulse Response Function has this element working to o⁄set the autoregressive
element ￿; reducing persistence. In period 2 the response is
’2
’1 ￿ 1; in period 3 it is ￿(
’2
’1)(1 ￿ ￿); from
then on it decays at ￿. With our calibration here ’1 is of order 1 while ’2 is of order 2￿: Thus in period
2 there is some echo of the impulse but by period 3 it has turned modestly negative
b) Floating rates under Monetary Targeting: Here we have:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
yt = ￿pue
t + ut
and the LM curve
mt ￿ pt =  1Etyt+1 ￿  2Rt + et
with money supply process
￿mt = ￿t
where for simplicity again we will suppress all errors other than the productivity process ut = ￿t
1￿￿L
and the money supply error process ￿t =
￿t
1￿￿1L which is now added.
The solution proceeds in the same way, except that now the real interest rate is determined in the










1￿￿  ;’3 =
￿
￿+￿ 2;’4 = 1
1￿ :
Here we ￿nd the same pattern as under ￿xed rates for the IRF of the productivity shock; but now
we have in addition the e⁄ect of the money shock. If we assume that approximately ￿ = ￿1, then this
adds an MA(2) where since ’4 > 1 > ’3 the lagged errors reinforce the e⁄ect of lagged in￿ ation. This
will mean that this money IRF will have persistence greater than ￿;thus in period 1 the value is
’4
’3 ￿1;
in period 2 ￿
’4
’3; from then decaying at the rate ￿: Given that monetary volatility in the UK was high
this term is likely to dominate the overall IRF.
c) Floating rates under In￿ ation Targeting:
Here we have:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
yt = ￿pue
t + ut
rt = ￿Et￿t+1 +  ￿t + it
Again we suppress all errors other than the productivity process ut = ￿t
1￿￿L and the monetary error
process it =
￿t
1￿￿1L. The solution is now:
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 ￿ ’1￿t + [’1￿ ￿ ’2]￿t￿1 ￿
(1￿￿L)
1￿￿1L [’3￿t + (’4 ￿ ￿1’3)￿t￿1]
where ’1 = 1
￿+￿ ;’2 =
￿(1￿￿)
￿ (1￿￿= );’3 =
￿
￿+￿ ;’4 = ￿1
 (1￿￿= )
Let us assume, as occurs in our models, that the in￿ ation response of interest rates, , is fairly large;
then both ’2 and ’4 will tend to be small. It can then be seen that the MA(1) term in both errors will
tend to cancel out the lagged in￿ ation e⁄ect, eliminating persistence (assuming as before that ￿1 = ￿
approximately).
10.2 New Keynesian Models:
(a) Fixed rates Here we approximate ￿￿ as unity so that the model can be written conveniently as:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 + ￿(Et￿t+1] + vFXt (IS)
and ￿t = ￿(yt ￿ y￿) + ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + uKt (Phillips)
We assume here the case where Etxt = E(xt j ￿t) = xt (full current information) as is normal in
New Keynesian models; again for simplicity we set the error term in the IS curve to zero. ut = ￿t
1￿￿L
where L is the lag operator.
The solution is obtained directly in terms of forward and backward operators as:




which we can rewrite as:
f￿￿B￿2 ￿ [￿ + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + ￿￿]B￿1 + [1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Lg￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)ut
We can factor the left hand side to obtain:
k(1 ￿ ￿1B￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2B￿1):(1 ￿ ￿3L)￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)ut
34where the roots ￿i must all be stable. Note that as ￿￿ tends to zero these roots are (forward) ￿
and ￿ and (backward) (1 ￿ ￿). Hence the two backward roots that determine the IRF of the supply
shock ￿t are ￿ and (1￿￿); there is no o⁄set from moving average terms. (Moving average terms will be
introduced as we introduce other errors; but each of the IRFs of these errors will have the same form
considered individually. The MA terms come from their cross-e⁄ects which will not alter this basic IRF
pattern). The impact e⁄ect of ￿t is determined by the forward roots so that the overall solution with








We can see therefore that under Fixed rates there will be substantial persistence imparted by the
backward indexation term in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve as well as the autoregressiveness of the
supply shock. Only the terms ￿￿ can a⁄ect the size of the backward root ￿3; however it turns out that
this tends to raise the value of ￿3 in our calibration here where ￿3 is barely short of unity.
b) Floating rates under Monetary Targeting: Here we have:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
￿t = ￿yt + ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + uKt
and the LM curve
mt ￿ pt =  1Etyt+1 ￿  2Rt + et
with money supply process
￿mt = ￿t
where for simplicity again we will suppress all errors other than the productivity process ut = ￿t
1￿￿L
and the money supply error process ￿t =
￿t
1￿￿1L which is now added.
The solution proceeds by using the forward and backward operators as above, except that now the
real interest rate is determined in the money market (Rt = rt + Etpt+1 ￿ Etpt): We obtain:
￿
(1 ￿ L)f1 ￿ (￿ ￿
￿ 1
 2 )B￿1g(1 ￿ ￿B￿1 ￿ [1 ￿ ￿]L) ￿
h




= (1 ￿ L)f1 ￿ (￿ ￿
￿ 1
 2 )B￿1gut +
￿￿
 2￿t
The LHS of this factorises as in the earlier New Keynesian model into a fourth order di⁄erence
equation with two forward and two backward roots. As ￿ tends to zero, the backward roots tend to
unity and (1 ￿ ￿), the forward to ￿ and ￿. However because the supply shock is di⁄erenced, the MA
process in it cancels out the strong persistence coming from these two backward roots and also from its
own autoregressiveness. However this is not true of the monetary growth shock ￿t whose e⁄ect will be
highly persistent from these two backward roots plus its autoregressiveness.
The only way to bring down this persistence would be for the backward roots to be diminished in
size by the e⁄ect of the terms in ￿: However, at least in our calibration here they are increased.
c) Floating rates under In￿ ation Targeting: Here we have:
yt = ￿Etyt+1 ￿ ￿rt + vFLt
￿t = ￿yt + ￿Et￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 + uKt
rt = ￿Et￿t+1 +  ￿t + it
Again we suppress all errors other than the productivity process ut = ￿t
1￿￿L and the monetary error
process it =
￿t
1￿￿1L. We now obtain, following the same operator methods:
35￿
f1 ￿ ￿B￿1g(1 ￿ ￿B￿1 ￿ [1 ￿ ￿]L) ￿ ￿￿B￿1 + ￿￿ 
￿
￿t
= f1 ￿ ￿B￿1gut ￿ ￿￿it
Here again the LHS factorises into two forward roots and one backward root (which is again tends
to (1 ￿ ￿) as ￿ tends to zero). Hence the IRFs of both the supply and the monetary shock have their
persistence determined by this root and by their own individual autoregressiveness. The only way that
this persistence can be reduced is by the terms in ￿ which re￿ ect the strength of the response to higher
in￿ ation and its pass-through via the Phillips Curve and the IS curve. In our calibration here we have
embodied a high long-run in￿ ation response of interest rates (thus long-run   = 10): The backward root
is approximately halved by this. Hence the In￿ ation Targeting regime under the New Keynesian model
does reduce persistence substantially, though not enough to match the data.
36